Home > Amicus Briefs
- Alexander v. City of Chicago
On November 28, 2016, the IML filed an amicus brief in support of the City of Chicago before the Supreme Court of Illinois.
- Simpson v. City of Peoria
On October 27, 2016, the IML filed an amicus brief in support of the City of Peoria in an Workers' Compensation case before the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District.
- Springfield Board of Ed. v. Illinois Attorney General
On October 11, 2016, the IML filed an amicus brief in support of the Springfield Board of Education in an OMA case before the Illinois Supreme Court. As before the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, the IML argued that the School Board did not violate Section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act, and that the AG's interpretation of Section 2(e) would lead to an absurd result.
- Hampton v MWRD (filed December 30, 2015)
On December 30, 2015, the IML filed an amicus brief with the Illinois Supreme Court in support of the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District. In this brief, the IML argued that MWRD did not "take" the plaintiffs' property when their properties flooded because the temporary flooding did not constitute a taking under the Takings Clause in the Illinois Constitution as the Illinois constitutional provision should not be applied and interpreted in "lockstep" with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution.
- Benton v. Granite City (filed September 3, 2015)
Attorneys for the IML filed an amicus brief in support of the City of Granite City before the Illinois Fifth District Appellate Court. In this case, the IML argued that municipalities are entitled to immunity under Section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act when a K-9 officer bites an individual while participating with human law enforcement officers in police services.
- Crystal Lake v Lefew (filed September 1, 2015)
Attorneys for the IML filed an amicus brief in support of the City of Crystal before the Illinois Second District Appellate Court. In the case, the IML argued that the City's challenged property tax levy ordinance was a valid exercise of the City's home rule powers. Alternatively, if there was any defect in the approval of the ordinance, the City had the authority and did properly ratify the ordinance.
- Board of Education v. Illinois Attorney General
On June 22, 2015, the IML filed an amicus brief in support of the School Board for Springfield School District 186 before the Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court. In this case, the IML argued that the School Board did not violate Section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act, and that the AG's interpretation of Section 2(e) would lead to an absurd result.
- Accel Entertainment Gaming v. Village of Elmwood Park (filed May 8, 2015)
The IML filed an amicus brief before the First District Illinois Appellate Court in support of the Village of Elmwood Park. In this case, the IML argued that the Video Gaming Act does not preempt home rule authority to license video gaming machines operating within the corporate limits of home rule communities.
- Gurba v. Community High School Dist. 155 (filed April 8, 2015)
The IML filed an amicus brief to the Illinois Supreme Court in support of the third-party defendant-appellee, the City of Crystal Lake, in what has become commonly referred to as "the Bleachers case." In this case, the IML argued that school boards are required to abide by the zoning regulations of the municipality in which they are located.
- Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan (filed January 30, 2015)
The IML and IPELRA filed a joint amici brief with the Illinois Supreme Court in this matter in support of the Village of Vernon Hills. In this joint brief, we argued, in conjunction with the village, that municipalities have the right to intervene in the legal process when determining eligibility of PSEBA benefits.
- Coleman v. East Joliet Fire Protection District (filed January 7, 2015)
The IML, IPELRA, and the ICCTA filed a joint amici brief in this matter in support of the defendants, two fire protection districts and a county. In this joint brief, we demonstrated to the Illinois Supreme Court that the "public duty rule" -- the common law rule which provides that public entities owe a duty to the public at large, not to each and every individual citizen -- has not been abolished by the enactment of the Tort Immunity Act and is still applicable to tort actions under Illinois law.
- Matthews v. CTA (filed December 19, 2014)
The City of Chicago and the IML filed an amicus brief in this matter in support of the CTA. In the joint brief we argued: (1) that the plaintiffs -- current and former CTA employees -- failed to state a promissory estoppel claim regarding retiree health care benefits; and (2) there was no presumption of vesting of retiree health care benefits conferred by the collective bargaining agreement.
- Board of Education v. City of Crystal Lake (filed April 25, 2014)
The issue in this case is whether school improvements are subject to municipal zoning regulation.
- Hayenga v City of Rockford (filed April 7, 2014)
The issue in this case was whether the city had the statutory and/or common law authority to impound a vehicle when the driver was arrested for a misdemeanor.
- Bruns v. City of Centralia (filed March 5, 2014)
The IML filed this brief on behalf of the City, arguing that the City was entitled to discretionary immunity for the plaintiff's injuries after she tripped and fell on an uneven portion of a sidewalk because the City was exercizing discretion and interpreting policy regarding the historical significance of a tree, the roots of which caused the defect in the sidewalk. In addition, the City had no duty to the plaintiff because the defect was an open and obvious danger, and the distraction exception did not apply because simply focussing on one's destination is not a distraction sufficient to invoke the distraction exception.
- Lake County Grading Co. v. Village of Antioch (filed January 8, 2014)
The IML filed an amicus brief in support of the Village of Antioch, arguing that the village was not liable to a subcontractor under the Public Construction Bond Act for failing to require a bond payment from a general contractor.
- Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan (filed November 25, 2013)
The IML filed an amicus brief in support of the village, arguing that the village was not precluded from the determination of eligibility for health insurance benefits under PSEBA.
- Pedersen v. Village of Hoffman Estates (filed October 25, 2013)
The IML filed this amicus brief on behalf of the Village, arguing that municipalities -- especially home-rule municipalities -- have the authority to establish procedures by which to determine an applicant’s eligibility for review of PSEBA benefits.
- Hampton v. MWRD (filed October 23, 2013)
The IML joined the IAWA to argue that the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 511 (2012), does not overrule the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in People ex rel Pratt v. Rosenfield, 399 Ill. 247 (1948), that temporary flooding is not a taking.
- Village of Lake in the Hills v. Niklaus (filed September 27, 2013)
The IML filed an amicus brief in this case in support of the village. The IML argued that a circuit court has the statutory authority to enforce administrative adjudication judgments under Division 1-2.1 of the Illinois Municipal Code.
- Board of Trustees v. Village of Riverdale (filed September 19, 2013)
The IML submitted an amicus brief to the First District Illinois Appellate Court in support of the Village of Riverdale in this matter. The League argued that the police pension board did not have the statutory authority to sue the village over funding levels of its police pension fund.
- Waverly v. TT Farms (Filed June 5, 2013)
On June 5, 2013, the Illinois Municipal League filed an amicus curiae brief in the Fourth District Appellate Court in the case of the City of Waverly v. TT Farms, Inc. In that case, the IML argued that livestock facilities are subject to municipal zoning authority.
- Harris v. Thompson (filed November 2, 2011)
The IML submitted an amicus brief to the Illinois Supreme Court in support of the Massac County Hospital District in Harris v. Thompson, where the issue of whether the statutory duty to generally exercise due care under the Illinois Vehicle Code overrides the specific statutory immunity for the negligence of emergency drivers under Section 5-106 of the Tort Immunity Act.
- Cieslewicz v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County (filed September 7, 2011)
The IML, with the Illinois Association of Park Districts, submitted an amicus brief in support of the Forest Preserve District in this case on September 7, 2011. The issues in the case are (1) whether units of local government can be considered the “owner” of stray dogs on public property within the meaning of the Animal Control Act; and (2) whether there is no willful and wanton exception to the absolute immunity expressly provided to local governments under §4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act.
- Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills (filed May 3, 2011)
On Tuesday, May 3rd, the IML submitted an amicus curiae brief in this case to the Illinois Supreme Court on behalf of the city. The IML argued that the PSEBA statute does not require municipalities to retroactively reimburse a disabled police officer, who was injured in the line-of-duty and who was awarded a disability pension three years later, the health insurance premiums that he paid before the award of the disability pension.
- Oak Lawn v ILRB (filed March 3, 2011)
This is a statutory interpretation case to determine the meaning of the term “manning” as it applies to mandatory bargaining requirements with respect to firefighters. The IML argued in its brief that the General Assembly intended the term “manning” to apply only to the number of firefighters on an engine; and, the language of the Labor Act precludes bargaining over the staffing levels at issue in this case.
- Ries v City of Chicago (filed September 28, 2010)
The case of Ries v. City of Chicago involved an accident that was the result of a driver who ran through a red light while fleeing the police. In the course of investigating an accident, a police officer placed the person who was suspected of causing the accident in the back of his still running squad car. After the officer returned to the scene to continue his investigation, the detainee stole the squad car and sped away. Other officers chased the stolen squad car. During that chase, the suspect ran through a red light and crashed into the plaintiffs' vehicle and injured them. The plaintiffs sued both the city and the investigating police officer. They did not sue the driver who actually caused the collision. The IML argued in this brief that the liability for the accident rests solely with the fleeing driver because he, alone, was responsible for his decision to steal a squad car, flee police, drive recklessly, and speed through a red light. It was these decisions that caused the accident-not the fact that the police were somewhere behind him. It is poor public policy to prohibit the police from chasing criminals.
- Gaffney v. Orland Fire Protection District (filed September 8, 2010)
This is another statutory-interpretation case concerning the definition of the word "emergency" in the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (PSEBA). This case is consolidated with the Lemmenes case.
- Lemmenes v. Orland Park Fire Protection District (filed August 4, 2010)
This is a statutory-interpretation case concerning the definition of the word "emergency" in the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (PSEBA). Click Here for the Appendix.
- Roselle v. Roselle Police Pension Board (filed December 18, 2008)
The Pension Code states that, upon the death of a police pensioner, his or her surviving spouse is entitled to the pension to which the pensioner was then entitled. Under this language, is the surviving spouse entitled to future increases that the officer would have received had he or she not died?
- Sangamon County Sheriff's Department v. Illinois Human Rights Commission (filed August 29, 2008)
Illinois' sexual-harassment statute states that an employer is responsible for the sexual harassment of its employees by nonmanagerial or nonsupervisory employees only if the employer becomes aware of the conduct and fails to take reasonable corrective measures. Does this statutory language make an employer strictly liable for any harassment committed by a supervisor—regardless of whether the harasser has supervisory authority over the victim?
- DeSmet v. County of Rock Island (filed September 14, 2005)
In this case, we argued with the City of Chicago that the appellate court correctly held that “police service” within the context of section 4-102 includes a local public entity’s response to a call reporting that a vehicle had been driven off a roadway. The court also correctly held that section 4-102 provides unqualified immunity because it contains no exception for willful and wanton conduct.
- Gaylor v. Village of Ringwood (filed July 14, 2005)
We argued that the two statutes at issue in the present matter, 65 ILCS 5/7-3-6 (the disconnection statute) and 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-1 (the annexation agreement statute), are in apparent conflict and could be harmonized.
- Moore v. Green (filed June 1, 2005)
We argued: (1) Sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act were not superceded by Section 305 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act pursuant to public policy; and (2) Section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity supercedes Section 305 of the Domestic Violence Act because Section 4-102 was amended immediately after the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act.
- Chatham v Sangamon County (filed February 8, 2005)
We argued that Section 11-15.1-2.1(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code did not violate Art. IV, Section 13 of the Illinois Constitution because: (1) Section 11-15.1-2.1(b) is consistent with the purpose of annexation agreements; and (2) the rationale for the classifications of counties in Section 11-15.1-2.1(b) is reasonable.
- Turcol v. Pension Board (filed December 14, 2004)
We argued that: (1) The pension board's decision denying plaintiff's application for disability was consistent with the legislative intent of Section 3-115 of the Illinois Pension Code; (2) The Illinois Supreme Court should not adopt the Illinois Appellate Court's decision in Coyne v. Milan Police Pension Board; and (3) The Illinois Supreme Court should adopt the Illinois Appellate Court's decision in Rizzo v. Board of Trustees.
- Church of Peace v City of Rock Island (filed November 3, 2004)
We argued that: (1) The City of Rock Island's service charge for its storm water utility is a fee for services rendered and not a tax upon real property; (2) the city's storm water utility ordinance is authorized under Illinois law; and (3) the city's storm water utility service charge is rationally related to its legitimate purpose and not arbitrary.
- Village of North Aurora v. Anker (filed January 14, 2004)
We argued that the Illinois General Assembly, through the Illinois Vehicle Code, intended to allow municipalities to adopt the vehicle weight and size limitations of the code by reference for non-designated highways within their jurisdiction without posting signs of those weight and size limitations.
- Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove (filed March 12, 2003)
The City of Chicago and the IML filed an amicus brief in this matter in support of the Village of Long Grove. We argued that the one-year statute of limitations found in Section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to all civil actions brought against a municipality.
- Abrams v. City of Chicago (filed January 15, 2003)
We argued that: (1) The plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege a genuine issue of material fact in their allegations of willful and wanton misconduct against the city to preclude summary judgment; and (2) The affirmation of the First District Appellate Court's ruling would impose a substantial burden upon Illinois municipalities.
- Krohe v. City of Bloomington (filed October 16, 2002)
With the Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association, we argued that the Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court majority in this case did not apply the appropriate principles of statutory construction when interpreting the meaning of "catastrophic injury" as use in the PSEBA.